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CORPORATIONS
LEWIS COLLENS*
RECENT CASES
HE PAST year has not been a particularly active one for the
legislature or the courts in the area of corporation law.' There
were five cases and one amendment to the Business Corporation
Act that merit attention.
In Stroh v. Blackhawk Holding Corp.,' the Illinois Supreme Court
held that it is proper for a corporation to issue voting shares which
have no right to receive current or liquidating dividends. The Black-
hawk Holding Corporation had 3,000,000 shares of authorized
Class A stock and 500,000 shares of authorized Class B stock. The
Class B stock had no right to participate in ordinary or liquidating
dividends. Upon formation, the company sold 500,000 Class A
shares, representing 46% of the voting power, to the public for
$2,000,000 ($4.00 per share). The corporate promoters and in-
siders purchased 87,868 Class A shares, representing 8% of the
voting power, for about $300,000 ($3.40 per share), and 500,000
Class B shares, representing 46% of the voting power, for $1,250
(1/4th cent per share). Thus, the public paid $2,000,000 for 46%
of the voting stock and the promoters paid slightly over $300,000
for 54% of the voting power. This information was fully disclosed
in the company's prospectus; hence, no issue of fraud was involved.
In August 1964, the Class B percentage of voting power was re-
duced to approximately 29%. The reduction was the result of a
two-for-one split of the Class A shares and the sale of an additional
61,945 shares to the public. Prior to the company's annual meeting
in 1968, a contest for control developed and a group of Class A
*Associate Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law; B.S., M.A. Uni-
versity of Illinois; J.D. University of Chicago.
1. This survey does not cover the Illinois and Federal Securities Acts.
2. 48 Ill. 2d 471, 272 N.E.2d 1 (1971).
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shareholders filed suit to enjoin the Class B shareholders from voting
at the June meeting. The trial court enjoined the voting of shares
on the ground that the issuance of the stock was an invalid ultra
vires act.3 This judgment was reversed by the appellate court, and
the supreme court in a 4-2 decision concurred with the appellate
court's decision.
The supreme court majority, in an opinion by Justice Davis, rea-
soned that "shares" are defined in the Business Corporation Act as
the "proprietary interests in the corporation," that "proprietary"
means "ownership" and that "ownership" means the "[1] right
to participate in the control of the corporation, [2] in its surplus or
profits, or [31 in the distribution of its assets."' (emphasis added).
The court held that the use of the disjunctive "or" in the definition
of ownership meant that a "share" need have only one of the three
enumerated characteristics, subject to the requirement5 that each
share of stock in an Illinois corporation have the right to vote. This
result was deemed consistent with Delaware decisions and with a
legislative intent to permit individuals to make their own private
contractual arrangements with regard to dividends and liquidation
rights. The court found further support for its view in the fact that
regulations of the Secretary of State provide for issuance of up to
one-third "voting only" stock.6
Justices Schaefer and Ward dissented from the majority on four
issues. First, they found in the statutory authorization of shares
with dividend preferences7 an implicit command that all shares must
have some dividend rights; second, they felt there was a misplaced
3. The terminology of the court and presumably the parties is not technically
correct. The plaintiffs would not have had standing to allege that issuance of the
stock was ultra vires, i.e., that this particular corporation was without power to act.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.8 (1971). The plaintiffs had to be arguing that is-
suance of the shares was illegal, i.e., that no corporation has power to issue the
shares.
4. 48 Ill. 2d at 476-77, 272 N.E.2d at 3-4. This language is from former
section 2(f) of the B.C.A., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.2(f) (1955). The court
said that the Committee Comments indicated the 1955 amendment caused "no
change in legal effect" and therefore the old definition of "share" continued to be
effective.
5. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.28 (1971).
6. 48 Ill. 2d at 483-84, 272 N.E.2d at 7. No supporting citation is given by
the court.
7. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.14(c) (1971).
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reliance by the majority on the disjunctive "or" because it would
then follow that a corporation could have non-voting stock-some-
thing clearly not permitted under statutory' and case law'; and
third, they argued that the reliance on Delaware analogies1" was
misleading because Delaware permits non-voting stock. 1 Finally
and most fundamentally, they contended that "ownership" is an eco-
nomic concept and therefore you cannot own part of a corporation
if you have no interest in the assets or earnings.
While the result reached by the majority has some support else-
where,12 it is difficult to quarrel with the dissent's view that an
economic interest in the corporation is the essence of stock owner-
ship. Strangely enough, the majority may have, in fact, accepted
the dissent's economic argument. The final paragraph of the ma-
jority opinion opens with the statement "[w]e have assumed, without
deciding, for the purpose of this decision only, that the Class B
stock carried with it no rights to dividends, current or liquidating."'"
(emphasis added). Since there was no dispute over the lower
court's finding that the shares had no rights to current or liquidating
dividends, the meaning of this sentence is far from clear. The ma-
jority may have been suggesting that "voting only" shares have an
inherent right to participate in current and liquidating dividends.
This would not be inconsistent with the result reached. The ma-
jority had to determine whether the shares had the right to vote-
not whether they could participate in dividends. Conceivably, they
could subsequently hold that all shares must participate in current
and liquidating dividends. However, if the majority really felt that
there was an inherent right to receive dividends, it is difficult to un-
derstand why they failed to say so. Such a statement would have
made most of the majority's discussion moot. It is indeed, as Justice
Schaefer noted, "hard to understand"' 4 the last paragraph of the
majority opinion.
8. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.28 (1971).
9. People ex rel. Watseka Telephone Co. v. Emmerson, 302 Ill. 300, 134 N.E.
707 (1922).
10. 48 Ill. 2d at 487-88, 272 N.E.2d at 9. The majority cited Lehrman v. Co-
hen, 43 Del. Ch. 222, 222 A.2d 800 (1966).
11. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 151(a) (1953).
12. Lehrman v. Cohen, 43 Del. Ch. 222, 222 A.2d 800 (1966).
13. 48 Ill. 2d at 484, 272 N.E.2d at 7.
14. Id.
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Even in light of Blackhawk, it is advisable for attorneys to avoid
creating "voting only" stock because the dissent's argument may ul-
timately prevail. Where issuance of such stock seems necessary to
achieve a desired voting balance, the safest course of action is to pro-
vide a miniscule dividend preference for the shares. For example,
in the Blackhawk situation, the Class B stock could have been given
the following characteristics: non-cumulative, non-participating with
annual dividend preference of 1/10th of a mil per share, and upon
liquidation 1/4 cent per share. This would have given the Class B
shareholders the right to receive $500 yearly whenever the Class A
shares were being paid dividends, and the right to a return of their
nominal capital contribution in the event of dissolution. Even such a
small economic interest presumably would have satisfied Justices
Schaefer and Ward, and eliminated any possible challenge to the
legality of the issuance of the stock.
The question of personal liability of shareholders for business
debts was involved in three cases-two of which held the share-
holders personally liable. In Califf v. Coca-Cola Company,'5 a
products liability suit was filed against the Coca-Cola Company
[CCC] and its wholly-owned subsidiary, Coca-Cola Bottling Com-
pany of Chicago [CCBC]. CCC manufactured and sold syrup to
CCBC which, in turn, manufactured and bottled the final soft drink
product which had exploded and injured plaintiff's eye. The court
granted CCC's motion to dismiss and said "[m]ere stock ownership
is insufficient to make a parent corporation liable for the tortious
acts of its subsidiary."'" The companies were independently oper-
ated, had separate facilities, separate boards of directors, and sep-
arate officers except for an assistant secretary and assistant treasurer.
In view of this separation and the financial stability of CCBC, the
result was quite predictable.
Liability was imposed on shareholders in Kingsberry Homes v.
Corey, 7 who had operated their business as partners until November
1967, when they formed the corporation. Several months prior to
incorporation, the partners began making purchases from plaintiff
and had executed personal guarantees to obtain credit. Defendants
15. 326 F. Supp. 540 (N.D. Il1. 1971).
16. Id. at 541.
17. 457 F.2d 181 (7th Cir. 1972).
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argued that the personal guarantees applied to purchases made prior
to incorporation (i.e., by the partnership) and not to purchases made
by the corporation. The court rejected this argument and said de-
fendants were estopped from denying personal liability because of
their failure to formally notify plaintiff of the fact of incorporation.
In a sharp dissent,' 8 Judge Stevens argued that plaintiff in fact had
knowledge of the incorporation, both through its regional sales man-
ager and because all invoices after the date of incorporation had
been paid by corporate check.
In Anzalone v. Durchslag,'9 liability was imposed on Durchslag, a
former shareholder, for money due plaintiff for goods delivered to
the business. In April 1963, Durchslag, a major shareholder in
Chicago Camcorp, Inc., approached Anzalone, an old friend, and
requested that Anzalone sell painting supplies to the corporation on
credit. The request was granted. In April 1964, Durchslag told
Anzalone that a new employee was being hired, that they were going
into painting in a big way, and that General Painting Contractors
was the name that was going to be used because it was more de-
scriptive. Anzalone said that he expressed reservations about Dur-
chslag's new employee, but "as long as Mr. Durchslag was behind
the whole situation and I had known him for so many years and his
family and doing business with them, and always been paid, I went,
just went along with them [sic]." 2  Anzalone further testified that
he was told "they were changing the name from Chicago Camp
Corp [sic] to General Painting Contractors, a division of that or
whatever . . .I am positive that is what he termed it as in forming
a new company."'"
From April to September 1964, supplies were purchased and bills
were paid by Chicago Camcorp checks. In September, Durchslag
told Anzalone he was no longer associated with General Painting
Contractors. When Anzalone asked whom he should see for money,
Durchslag replied, "You will have to chase Jack Richards. '22
Because the court found that Durchslag had represented that he
18. Id. at 183-84 (dissenting opinion).
19. 1111. App. 3d 125, 273 N.E.2d 752 (1971).
20. Id. at 127, 273 N.E.2d at 753.
21. Id. at 127, 273 N.E.2d at 754.
22. Id.
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was acting for General Painting Contractors, a new corporation
which in fact did not exist, Durchslag and his "co-shareholder" were
held liable as partners.23  Having decided that Durchslag was acting
for a nonexistent corporation, the court had to dispose of one final
argument-that Anzalone should not be permitted to recover from
Durchslag personally because credit was extended to a "business"
rather than to Durchslag personally. The court rejected this "estop-
pel" argument because the trial court had found as a fact that Anza-
lone had relied on Durchslag's personal credit.
Finally, the opinion contains confusing dicta regarding the right
of a corporation to use another name. The court suggests that it
would have been improper for Chicago Camcorp to have done busi-
ness as "General Painting Contractors, a division of Chicago Cam-
corp."24  It says that such a designation would not inform creditors
that the two companies were one and the same. No authority for
this view is cited and it seems questionable on its face.2"
Anzalone and Kingsberry both illustrate the continuing difficulties
encountered by shareholders of close corporations in trying to in-
sulate themselves from personal liability for contractual debts of the
business. A small businessman who wishes to avoid personal liabil-
ity when making purchases for the corporation must make it ab-
solutely clear to the seller that he is acting on behalf of the corpo-
ration. Any ambiguity will be resolved against the individual pur-
chaser and he will be held personally liable.
In Somers v. AAA Temporary Services, Inc.,26 the issue was the
effectiveness of a bylaw amendment enacted by the corporation's
only two shareholders. The amendment purported to reduce the
number of directors on the board from three to two. In a question-
able decision, the First District Appellate Court held the amendment
23. Id. at 130, 273 N.E.2d at 756.
24. Id. at 129, 273 N.E.2d at 754.
25. It is hard to believe that the average person would be confused by such a
designation. It is common for large corporations to use "division" designations.
See e.g., Kingsberry Homes v. Corey, 457 F.2d 181 (7th Cir. 1972), where suit
was brought by "Kingsberry Homes, a division of Boise Cascade Corporation."
It is unclear whether the use of a "division" designation when soliciting business
violates ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, § 211.1 (1971), which prohibits "assuming any
other or different name," or ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 96, §§ 4-8 (1971), which prohibits
a corporation using a name other than its "real name."
26. 5 Ill.App.3d 931, 284 N.E.2d 462 (1972).
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invalid because it had not been approved by the directors as re-
quired by the Business Corporation Act.27
One would have assumed that under the principles enunciated by
the Illinois Supreme Court in Galler v. Galler21 that a different re-
sult would have been reached. In Somers, the court quoted what it
thought was the Galler holding:
There is no reason why mature men should not be able to adapt the statutory
form to the structure they want, so long as they do not endanger other stock-
holders, creditors, or the public, or violate a clearly mandatory provision of the
corporation laws.29
Since no one in Somers thought that the shareholders' amendment
of the bylaws endangered the shareholders, creditors or the public,
the court had to find that the B.C.A.-prescribed amendment proce-
dures were mandatory. They said:
The Galler court did not say that the Illinois Business Corporation Act may be
disregarded in the case of a close corporation. Slight deviations from corporate
norms may be permitted. However, action by the shareholders which is in direct
contravention of the statute cannot be allowed. 30
Galler did not indicate which provisions of the B.C.A. were to be
considered mandatory. However, it is hard to believe that the Som-
ers situation falls within this category. After all, Galler approved a
shareholders' agreement that specified dividend payments and sal-
aries-two things that are normally within the exclusive province of
the board of directors. Surely, determination of the number of di-
rectors is of less significance than dividend payments and salaries.
The practical consequences of the court's decision are particularly
unfortunate. The plaintiff in the case was the ousted third director
who owned no stock in the corporation. In all likelihood, he was
acting on behalf of Kay, one of the two shareholders. This would
indicate that Kay and Raimer, the other shareholder, had a falling
out and that the suit was designed to allow Kay and the plaintiff
27. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.25 (1971).
28. 32 Ill. 2d 16, 203 N.E.2d 577 (1964).
29. Id. at 30, 203 N.E.2d at 585. The language cited is actually from a Yale
Law Review article by George Hornstein which the court introduced with this
comment: "Numerous helpful textual statements and law review articles dealing
with the judicial treatment of the close corporation have been pointed out by coun-
sel. One article concludes ...... While the Hornstein language does not represent
the precise holding of Galler, it is hard to argue with the proposition that a manda-
tory provision must be obeyed. The problem is determining what is mandatory.
30. 5 Ill.App.3d at 935, 284 N.E.2d at 465.
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to gain control of the board and the business.3' The court's decision
goes a long way toward helping Kay reach that objective. It is
doubtful that such a result will promote an equitable settlement of
the shareholders' differences.
LEGISLATION
On July 1, 1972, the new short form merger statute became effec-
tive.32  This statute governs mergers of subsidiaries into their parent
corporations where the parent owns at least 99% of each class of
the subsidiary's outstanding stock. The statute substantially simpli-
fies the normal merger procedure"3 by eliminating the need for ap-
proval by the board of directors and shareholders of the subsidiary
and the need for approval by the shareholders of the parent.
In addition to simplifying procedure, the statute eliminates the
right of shareholders of the parent to dissent from the merger, i.e.,
to be paid the fair value of their shares in cash. However, this does
not impose a hardship on the parent's shareholders, since the tradi-
tional reason for providing "dissenters' rights" does not exist, i.e.,
there is no significant change in the economic entity from the view-
point of the parent's shareholders.
From the viewpoint of the shareholders of the subsidiary corpo-
ration, the new corporation, in which they may be asked to accept
stock, is a substantially changed economic entity. Since they also
are given no voice in determining the plan of merger, it is not
surprising that their right to dissent has been preserved. To exer-
cise this right the shareholder must notify the corporation in writing
within 30 days after the plan of merger has been mailed. Within 10
days after receiving the written objection, the corporation must make
the shareholder an offer to purchase his shares at "fair value." If no
agreement is reached, the shareholder may file suit within 90 days
after receiving the corporation's offer. The Act provides for the
31. The effect of the court's decision would be to reinstate Somers as a di-
rector because ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.34 (1971) provides that "[e]ach director
shall hold office . . . until his successor shall have been elected and qualified."
He would continue in office until the two shareholders would agree on a replace-
ment-something that Kay obviously would not do so long as Somers continued to
support her.
32. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.66(a) (1971).
33. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, §§ 157.61-69 (1971).
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assessment of costs, including appraisers' fees, against the corpora-
tion if the court finds that the fair value of the shares "materially
exceeds" the amount which the corporation offered to pay.
However, there is no provision for the payment of attorneys' fees
to the prevailing party in the litigation. While it may be argued that
this will tend to reduce litigation, it should be remembered that the
statute, in effect, gives the corporation the right to force out the mi-
nority shareholder. Under such circumstances, the cost of an under-
valuation of the stock by the corporation would seem to be more
properly borne by the corporation.3 4
34. There are no states that provide for attorneys' fees under these circum-
stances. See Model Business Corporation Act Ann. 2d § 81 (1971).
